Copilot status
Read from the status pages Copilot depends on, checked by Traycer's servers.
Checks every 60s · last checked
Current state
GitHub
Components
- Git Operationsoperational · 99.99% uptime
- Webhooksoperational · 99.97% uptime
- Visit www.githubstatus.com for more informationoperational
- API Requestsoperational · 99.89% uptime
- Issuesoperational · 99.89% uptime
- Pull Requestsoperational · 99.77% uptime
- Actionsoperational · 99.6% uptime
- Packagesoperational · 100% uptime
- Pagesoperational · 99.98% uptime
- Copilotoperational · 99.67% uptime
- Codespacesoperational · 100% uptime
- Copilot AI Model Providersoperational · 99.84% uptime
Incidents
Yesterday · · GitHub
resolved in 2 h 7 min
Disruption with Email Delivery
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
Yesterday · · GitHub
resolved in 51 min
Incident with Webhooks API
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
11 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 33 min
Impact across multiple GitHub products including Actions, Pages, and Copilot products.
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
11 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 4 min
Incident with Webhooks
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
10 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 104 min
Incident with Git Operations and Pull Requests
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
9 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 49 min
Degraded availability for GPT-5.3 Codex and GPT-5.6 models in Copilot
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
9 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 47 min
Incident with Actions and Checks API
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
9 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 110 min
Incident with Webhooks and Actions
On November 9, 2026, from 09:23 to 11:40 UTC, one of our job queue clusters was degraded, delaying webhook deliveries, Actions workflow runs, and Dependabot and dependency graph updates. Until mitigation at 10:37 UTC, an average of 26% of webhook deliveries were delayed, peaking at 30%, and the backlog cleared by 11:40 UTC. Some deliveries were delayed by up to 3.5 hours, and delays for a small share began as early as 01:00 UTC. Actions skips events older than 30 minutes, so some workflow runs did not start. <br /><br />The incident was caused by a degraded host that had slowed one of the cluster's Kafka brokers since November 7. The broker stopped reporting the metrics our alerts rely on, so we did not identify it until it stalled the cluster on November 9. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by removing the broker from service. We have since added an alert that pages us within 30 minutes when a host slows a broker this way, so we can remove the broker before it affects customers.
9 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 3 h 11 min
Increased timeouts due to surge in anonymous users
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
8 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 117 min
Increase in timeouts for some unauthenticated users
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
5 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 45 min
Degraded performance for multiple GitHub services
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
5 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 52 min
Incident with Actions
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
4 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 36 min
Incident with Actions
Please refer to the combined summary in this related incident: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/xr3myzj7ms51
4 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 56 min
Incident with Actions and Pages
On November 4, 2026, between 15:49 UTC and 16:48 UTC, and again between 17:20 UTC and 17:55 UTC, GitHub Actions, Pages, Webhooks, Code Scanning, and Copilot coding agent experienced delays. During this time, Actions workflow runs and job status updates were delayed by up to 25 minutes. Pages deployments dropped to about 4% of normal volume, webhook deliveries dropped to about 58% of normal volume, and Code Scanning analyses and Copilot coding agent sessions were delayed. Delayed events were processed after mitigation. <br /><br />This incident was caused by a configuration change to an internal event-routing service that unexpectedly paused delivery of several event streams. The change depended on feature flags that were not set up as intended, which the service did not handle gracefully. We mitigated the first period by rolling back the configuration change at 16:14 UTC. The code change itself was not reverted by the rollback, so a subsequent deployment reintroduced it. We mitigated the second period at 17:40 UTC by rolling back again, then processed queued events and cleared backlogs. <br /><br />We are taking several steps to prevent a repeat. The routing service will keep its existing behavior when a feature toggle is missing, so a misconfigured flag can no longer pause delivery. We are adding a pre-deploy check that each routing flag exists and is registered under the correct owning service, and we are making flag ownership less error-prone to set. We are also improving alerting so we detect paused event delivery sooner.
4 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 2 h
Incident with Pull Requests, Git Operations and Issues
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
4 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 77 min
Increased task-related errors for Copilot Mission Control
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
3 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 104 min
Incident with Git Operations
On November 3, 2026, between 15:00 UTC and 22:37 UTC, Git operations over HTTPS on GitHub.com were degraded. Clones, fetches, and pushes over HTTPS were slow, and some failed. For about half of Git HTTPS traffic, median response time rose from under 100 milliseconds to as high as 5 seconds. On average, the error rate was 0.65% and peaked at 1.29% of requests to the service. Git operations over SSH were not affected. <br /><br />This was due to a buildup of excess connections on the hosts that serve Git HTTPS traffic, which saturated their network capacity and caused slow and failed responses for all clients served by those hosts. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by blocking a client traffic pattern at our load balancers and reloading them, which released the excess connections. The block also prevented some users of one third-party integration from performing Git operations over HTTPS until we removed it on November 4 at 13:26 UTC. <br /><br />We are working to alert on sustained Git HTTPS latency sooner and make load balancer mitigations take effect on existing connections immediately.
3 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 31 min
Incident with API, Git, and Copilot requests
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
2 Nov 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 38 min
Elevated errors on GPT-5.4 Nano
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
30 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 2 h 30 min
Incident with Dependabot
On October 30, 2026, between 20:15 and 21:56 UTC, an advisory-publication-driven fan-out caused an unexpected saturation of network connections to the Dependabot alerts datastore. During this period we observed a high rate of write failures on this datastore; users saw elevated failure rates when dismissing or resolving Dependabot alerts, as well as failures when linking Dependabot update pull requests to Dependabot security alerts. We also observed delays in creating and updating security alerts that extended through November 2, 2026.<br /><br />The unexpected fan-out was caused by a missing job queue throttle after the queues for the fan-out work were migrated as part of system maintenance. We have restored the fan-out throttle and further isolated and throttled these processes to guard against further disruptions.
30 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 93 min
Incident with Actions, Pages, and Webhooks
On October 30, 2026, from 17:50 to 18:32 UTC, Actions, Pages, and Webhooks experienced degraded performance. Actions workflow processing, Pages deployments, and webhook deliveries were delayed, and code search and live updates returned errors. Some Actions queues took additional time to drain after mitigation, and the incident was resolved at 19:23 UTC. <br /><br />The impact was triggered by maintenance on a cloud network gateway connecting an Actions service in the GitHub data center to Redis clusters in the Central US Azure region. The service's Redis client retried aggressively and redialed those connections. That produced a connection storm that saturated the gateway, with about 90% of connection attempts failing. Other services sharing the same network path were degraded as well. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by removing the affected resources from rotation, which ended the connection storm and allowed the gateway to recover. We have already reduced the number of connection retries in the impacted service and are further improving retry behavior with jittered backoff, shorter connect timeouts, and retry budgets. We are also working with our infrastructure team to make GitHub more resilient to gateway maintenance.
30 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 32 min
Disruption with GitHub services
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
29 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 2 h 30 min
Disruption with Copilot Cloud services
On October 29, 2026, between 05:50 UTC and 12:40 UTC, Copilot agent sessions on GitHub.com and in VS Code were degraded. Live session updates often failed to load, and on average 2.14% of requests to the agent sessions service failed, with a peak of 8.61%. For about 10 minutes around 09:20 UTC, up to 40% of requests to list or create agent sessions failed. Copilot Chat on GitHub.com showed degraded agent session features during this time. The issue occurred when a large increase in task-list requests from a client experiment overloaded the cache that supports the agent sessions service. We mitigated the impact by increasing cache capacity, reducing nonessential load on the cache, and disabling the client experiment. We are moving rate limiting to separate infrastructure, reducing client polling, and improving our alerting so we can detect and respond to this type of overload faster.
28 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 75 min
Disruption with some Copilot services
On October 28, 2026, between 13:52 and 15:24 UTC, Copilot users saw errors when using several GPT-family models and the MAI Code 1.1 Flash model. Affected experiences included Copilot Chat in IDEs and on GitHub.com, the Copilot CLI, Copilot Code Review, the Copilot Coding Agent, Code Scanning Autofix, and Code Quality. About 9.73% of requests to the affected models failed, with a peak of about 36.97% at the start of the incident.<br /><br />The errors happened because a credential that we use to authenticate with an upstream model provider became invalid. We mitigated the incident by replacing the credential and redeploying the service. We are strengthening how we manage credentials for upstream providers to prevent this type of failure, returning retryable errors when an upstream provider rejects a request, and improving our monitoring so that we detect and mitigate this type of problem faster in the future.
27 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 0 min
Elevated 404s for GitHub App s2s tokens in git/API
Between 0655 and 0801 UTC on 10/27, customers experienced increased failure rates for API and git requests authenticated with server-to-server tokens for GitHub Apps (excluding Actions tokens). During this window, authenticated git operations mistakenly returned 404 for 1.24% (2.6x) of requests on average and 2.49% (5.3x) at peak. These failures were caused by a scheduled maintenance event where GitHub migrated 7 tables between two MySQL clusters in our IAD and Azure Central US datacenters. One of the affected tables stores installation records for GitHub App server-to-server tokens (excluding Actions). We've successfully completed several of these migrations in recent months without notable customer impact. However, in this case, the migration coincided with a scheduled cleanup job on the installation records table, which deleted approximately 59 million records from 0444-0617 UTC. As a result, the gh-ost tooling used in the migration experienced inter-cluster replication delays (up to 1 hour at peak). At 0655 UTC, we begin transitioning reads of the target tables to the new MySQL cluster, with 100% of reads cutover at 0721 UTC. Customer impact began, but was not detected, throughout the read cutover and persisted until completion of the write cutover at 0801 UTC. We are updating our processes and automation to prevent a repeat of this incident, including disabling overlapping cleanup jobs prior to these migrations and blocking the cutover of reads when replication delays are high.
26 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 9 min
Incident with Actions, Issues, API Requests and Pull Requests
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
23 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 42 min
Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 Service Issues
Between 23:28 and 00:23 UTC on October 27, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting Grok 4.6 and Grok 4.7 models. Users encountered elevated error rates when using these models.<br /><br />The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring and coordinated with the provider. Our automated model-warning system activated in-product warnings for affected models during the incident. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.
23 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 3 h 53 min
Disruption with Dependabot Alerts
We identified that an advisory-publication driven fan-out was overwhelming Dependabot alert processing on repositories by saturating the queue with its own events, delaying processing of events related to repository pushes.<br /><br />We have now isolated this fan-out and applied a throttle so it runs at a fixed rate and cannot delay other events. This remediation has successfully prevented a new fan-out process impacting users.
23 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 36 min
Delayed Actions status check results
On October 23, 2026, between 07:06 UTC and 07:27 UTC, GitHub Actions workflow run results were delayed. Job status, check run updates, and logs in the GitHub UI and API updated with an average delay of about 2 minutes, and some updates were delayed by up to about 7 minutes. <br /><br />During this window, a storage dependency that Actions uses to process workflow logs and artifacts throttled our requests. This slowed result processing, causing updates to queue up. The queue was fully processed by 07:27 UTC, shortly after the throttling stopped. <br /><br />To reduce the risk of recurrence, we have added several storage accounts to increase capacity, and we are working on additional steps to continue to scale. We are also working with our storage provider to understand why the throttling occurred, and improving how result processing handles storage throttling and how quickly we detect it.
22 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 11 h 2 min
Project updates delayed
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
22 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 61 min
Incident with Actions
On October 22, 2026, from 13:05 to 15:20 UTC, our event streaming platform was degraded resulting in elevated job processing latency spikes of 19-35 seconds and elevated job processing times of 4m – this resulted in delayed Actions workflow and step results (up to 13m), notifications (20m) and repository push events (12m). Recovery for repositories began at 14:32, with Actions recovery beginning at 14:59. The issue reoccurred at 16:26 again impacting Actions runs, repo push events, and notifications. Recovery began at 17:16 and completed at 2:07. <br /><br />The incident was caused by a significant increase in load coupled with client connection storms during a deployment overloading our Kafka event streaming brokers. <br /><br />To prevent future recurrence, we have expanded the affected cluster, shifted traffic to less loaded clusters, and implemented tunable client reconnect backoff.
21 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 4 h 30 min
Delays for Pull Requests and Webhook deliveries
This incident has been resolved. Thank you for your patience and understanding as we addressed this issue. A detailed root cause analysis will be shared as soon as it is available.
19 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 68 min
Degraded availability for GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages and Webhooks
On October 19, 2026, between 15:24 and 16:52 UTC, GitHub Actions, GitHub Pages, and webhooks generated by Actions were degraded. Live updates on GitHub.com and code search were also degraded for part of this time. No data was lost. <br /><br />Impact <br /><br /> - Workflow status updates, logs, and checks were delayed. <br /> - 5.13% of jobs on GitHub-hosted runners were delayed in starting, and 0.02% of workflow runs failed. <br /> - During the first 30 minutes, 8.47% of requests to the Actions jobs REST API returned errors. <br /><br />Pages deployments and webhooks generated by Actions runs were delayed. <br /><br />An internal Actions service that stores logs and run status lost connections to some of its cache servers in one cloud region and immediately retried them from every server at once. The resulting surge of new connections overloaded a shared network link between our data center and that region, which also disrupted other services that use the same link. We mitigated the incident by moving the Actions service off the affected cache servers and reducing connections from other services on the link. We then processed the delayed Actions work. We are continuing to investigate the cause of the initial connection timeouts. <br /><br />We were already in the process of rolling out a limit on how quickly this service can open new connections, but it was still in shadow mode (logging only, not enforcing) at the time of the incident. We have since fully enforced it and capped the service's concurrent connection attempts. We are extending these limits to other Actions services, adding backoff to retries, limiting how much shared network capacity a single service can use, and improving alerting so we can find the source of connection surges faster.
15 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 24 min
CCA Automations are delayed when starting an Automation
We suspected that CCA Automations were experiencing delays when users start an Automation, but further investigation found that there was no delay or impact to CCA Automations.<br />
14 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 0 min
[Retroactive] Actions workflow run logs delayed
On October 13, around 20:42 UTC, an infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to have delays showing logs for workflow runs. No logs were lost and the issue has now been resolved and log processing has caught up. The actual workflows producing the logs were not impacted and ran normally and no run delays or check delays occurred.
12 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 7 h 54 min
Incident with Actions, Pull Requests and Issues
On October 12th 2026 11:51 UTC GitHub experienced elevated 500 responses across several application pages. This caused failures on Issues and Pull Requests as well as Projects and Actions. Customers also experienced delayed notifications in their web inbox and via email. <br /><br />The immediate impact to Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions was mitigated by 12:41 UTC on October 12th. Notifications deliveries to the web inbox and via email were recovering at 15:27 UTC and fully mitigated by 20:16 UTC. <br /><br />The incident was triggered through a latent condition in our notifications delivery pipeline that put a high volume of an expensive query on our sharded database replicas. This reduced available database capacity to serve requests for Issues, Pull Requests, Projects, and Actions.<br /><br />We have fixed the notifications pipeline’s code path that issued the expensive query. We are also improving resilience of the database layer to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents.
7 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 48 min
Incident with Git Operations, Issues, Actions and Pull Requests
On October 7, 2026, from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC, GitHub experienced a recurrence of the write-operation outage from earlier that day. Both outages shared the same root cause. Please refer to the combined summary covering both incidents, their impact, and our prevention measures: https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/djlmxz2zd0j7
7 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 0 min
Incident with Git Operations, Pull Requests and Actions
On October 7, 2026, GitHub had two outages of write operations with the same cause, totaling about 19 minutes. The first ran from 15:06 to 15:16 UTC (about 10 minutes) and the second from 16:52 to 17:01 UTC (about 9 minutes). In both windows, actions that save or change data failed across Git operations, pull requests, issues, GitHub Actions, the API, webhooks, sign-in and authentication, GitHub Apps and OAuth, code scanning, Codespaces, and Copilot. Reading data was largely unaffected. In the first outage, 5.6% of all web and API requests failed, peaking at 8.9%, and more than 12,000 organizations saw failed requests. Up to 26% of Git authentication requests failed, and 17% of Actions workflow runs failed with infrastructure errors. In the second outage, 6.2% of web and API requests failed, peaking at 9.3%, and more than 11,000 organizations were affected. Up to 25% of Git authentication requests failed, and 19% of Actions workflow runs failed. No databases experienced data loss, and operations retried after recovery succeeded. GitHub relies on an internal service that keeps track of which database servers should receive new and updated data. While replacing machines that run this service as part of regular maintenance, one of the new machines started with an outdated copy of its records, which still listed database servers we had already retired. When this node came online, it incorrectly modified routing configuration with the outdated records, routing write requests to non-existent database servers. Each outage ended when one of our established machines with correct configuration became the leader of the quorum and sent the correct configuration. After the first outage, we identified the new machine as the source and paused automated maintenance to stop it from being leader again. At 16:52 UTC, an automated maintenance task that did not honor the pause put it back in charge, and the outage happened again. We shut that machine down at 17:02 UTC and have since removed it, and the automation now honors the pause, which was a new regression due to an update of our puppet infrastructure. To prevent recurrence, we are clearing retired database servers from the service's records before any new machine is added, and we are keeping new machines from being elected leader until their records have been checked. We are also changing our systems to reject configuration that point to servers that don't exist and to keep using the last known-good settings instead. Finally, we are giving responders a faster way to take a misbehaving machine out of service, and adding alerts so changes like this are spotted within seconds. We will share a more detailed write-up of these incidents in our monthly availability report, along with the status of the repairs we are making to prevent issues like these in the future.
6 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 3 h 43 min
Several services are degraded
On October 6, 2026, from 19:44 to 19:50 UTC, GitHub experienced a service outage with elevated error rates peaking at 1.30% of all requests, totaling approximately 1.16 million failed requests. This impacted 12 services across GitHub, including Pull Requests, Webhooks, Repos, OAuth, Git over SSH, Codespaces, and Gists. The incident was triggered by GitHub Enterprise Importer (GEI) making multiple, long duration queries which saturated a database connection pool. Recovery was seen at approximately 19:50 UTC once the migration's calls stopped; GEI migrations were reenabled at 23:32 UTC after a code fix was merged.<br /><br />We have completed a detailed root-cause review and are implementing improved database-health safeguards. We will continue to review and add additional safeguards to prevent future recurrence.
5 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 105 min
Disruption with some GitHub services
On October 5, 2026, between 23:05 UTC and 00:11 UTC on October 6, some users experienced slow page loads, timeouts, and errors when accessing organization and enterprise billing, licensing, and settings pages. On average, the error rate was 1.9% and peaked at 13.8% of requests to the service that powers these pages.<br /><br />This was caused by a networking failure, which disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database services. We mitigated the incident by shifting the database traffic to a healthy region.<br /><br />We are working to make regional database failover faster and more complete, reduce timeouts so these pages fail fast instead of hanging, and add latency-based alerting to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future. We continue to partner with our cloud provider to understand the underlying network failure.
5 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 3 h 38 min
Incident with Actions
On October 5, 2026, between 18:48 and 22:49 UTC, GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners experienced degraded performance. Over the full incident, 14.3% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners and 26.5% of individual GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes. <br /><br /> <br />During the roughly 90-minute period of highest impact, 47.0% of workflow runs using GitHub-hosted runners failed and 71.9% of GitHub-hosted jobs did not start within five minutes, while existing Pages sites continued to serve normally. A portion of customers also encountered intermittent errors in repository lists, licensing and billing pages, and some Copilot features. Self-hosted runners were not affected. <br /><br /><br />The incident was caused by a partial networking failure that disrupted connectivity between one of our on-premises datacenter regions and a subset of cloud-hosted regional database and storage services. <br /><br /><br />We mitigated the incident by shifting database and storage traffic to healthy regions and endpoints and increasing capacity for affected compute services. GitHub Actions and Hosted Runners recovered by 21:54 UTC, and all affected services recovered by 22:49 UTC. <br /><br /> <br />We are partnering with our cloud provider to understand the network failure and identify improvements to network-path resilience, detection, and recovery for similar incidents.
1 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 3 h 9 min
Actions Job Delays
On October 1, 2026, GitHub Actions experienced two periods of delayed and failed job starts on GitHub-hosted runners, beginning at approximately 14:15 UTC. Across the 14:15–17:56 UTC incident-response window, approximately 0.68% of workflow runs experienced start delays, and 0.196% of jobs failed to start. <br /><br />A routing change at our cloud provider concentrated API traffic on a single backend, causing an increase in rate-limit errors. Incorrect retry behavior in the provider’s inventory service added load to the affected APIs, compounding the rate limiting. This disrupted runner provisioning and reduced available capacity in affected regions. The resulting increase in demand in unaffected regions exposed a concurrency limit in our job-assignment system, delaying jobs even where runners were available. <br /><br />During the response, we increased job-assignment concurrency, scaled runner capacity, and worked with our cloud provider to reduce API load by excluding our runner subscriptions from its inventory service. By approximately 16:15 UTC, jobs were starting and executing as expected. We continued mitigation and monitoring until the incident was resolved at 17:56 UTC. <br /><br />Our cloud provider has since increased resource-management API rate limits for our workloads. To reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents, we are also adding more granular rate-limiting alerts and updating our job-assignment system to handle increased demand across fewer available regions.
1 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 20 min
Elevated request latency
On October 1, 2026, between 13:04 UTC and 13:34 UTC, users experienced two periods of slow page loads and intermittent request failures on GitHub.com. On average, the error rate was 0.52% and peaked at 6.13%. An unusually high volume of incoming traffic placed additional load on our traffic-handling infrastructure, delaying requests before they reached our application servers. Performance returned to normal as the traffic subsided, and we have since applied additional traffic filtering to protect against similar traffic. We are improving alerting for delays in our traffic-handling infrastructure and strengthening our automated traffic protections to reduce our time to detection and mitigation.
1 Oct 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 0 min
[Retroactive] Actions workflow run failures after deployment gate approvals
On October 1, around 02:00 UTC, an isolated infrastructure failure caused GitHub Actions to lose execution state for a small number of existing workflow runs. Affected runs may remain stuck, fail deployment approvals, or return errors when cancelled. Service connectivity has recovered, but the lost state cannot be restored by retrying an approval. If you're affected, you can trigger a new run or contact GitHub Support with links to your stuck runs so we can unblock them. Once cleared, select "Re-run all jobs." This preserves the workflow run ID but starts a new attempt, rebuilds artifacts, and requires fresh deployment approvals. Before rerunning, check whether any deployment steps already completed to avoid repeating changes.
28 Sep 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 52 min
Copilot Code Review is unable to complete reviews
On September 28, 2026, between 19:23 UTC and 22:08 UTC the Copilot Code Review service was degraded and pull request reviews did not complete in all environments. On average, approximately 70% of requested reviews did not complete. Reviews requested during this window were not automatically retried, and users needed to re-request a review from their pull request. This was due to a change in a dependent service that stopped delivering data Copilot Code Review needs to complete a review. Review completion is an inherently delayed signal, because each review job takes time to start and finish, so it took longer to detect the impact.<br /><br />We mitigated the incident by reverting the change.<br /><br />We are working to add a faster signal for reviews that fail to complete, add deployment validation that confirms a Copilot Code Review completes end to end, improve how we track internal dependencies between services, and make our deployment pipeline more reliable to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
24 Sep 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 3 h 50 min
Disruption with billing information updates
Beginning on September 22, 2026 at 11:51 UTC, approximately 1,700 users experienced delays and errors when adding or updating billing address information because requests to the address validation service timed out or failed. Within the affected address validation flow, requests failed at an average rate of 69.3%, reaching 100% at peak. <br /><br />An operating system upgrade exposed a compatibility issue in an adapter used by our HTTP client library, causing requests to stall. A subsequent change to shorten request timeouts caused stalled requests to return connection errors and increased the failure rate. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident on September 24, 2026 at 20:24 UTC by changing the HTTP client used for address validation. We have added alerting to detect similar issues sooner and are extending the fix to other integrations.
23 Sep 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 18 h 44 min
Incident across several services
Starting at 07:57 UTC on September 23, GitHub experienced elevated 500 and 404 responses across several application pages. This caused failures when installing GitHub Apps, creating organizations, and making some organization membership changes. Customers also experienced delayed label updates and stale search results in Projects. <br /><br />The infrastructure failure was isolated to our Azure Central US region. The API errors were mitigated by 10:58 UTC on September 23. Projects' processing continued to recover while an accumulated backlog was drained, and full service was restored at 04:55 UTC on September 24. <br /><br />The incident was caused by a failed planned maintenance operation on a primary database. Automated recovery initiated an emergency database failover, after which several replicas in the affected region were unable to resume replication correctly. This reduced available database capacity and caused the API errors and downstream Projects processing delays. <br /><br />We have mitigated the immediate failure mode. We are also improving maintenance safety checks, database failover handling, post-failover replica validation, and downstream processing resilience to reduce the likelihood and impact of similar incidents.
20 Sep 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 69 min
Incident with Pull Requests
On September 20, 2026, between 21:46 and 22:24 UTC the Pull Requests service was degraded and pull request merge and test-merge commits were created late, with delays reaching approximately four minutes at peak. Merge commits were delayed rather than lost. Because some Actions workflow runs start only after a pull request's merge commit is created, a subset of workflow runs for pull request events were also delayed. <br /><br />This was due to a routine repository maintenance job for an unusually large repository consuming nearly all of the memory on a single Git storage server, which left that server unable to serve the Git operations used to create merge commits. <br /><br />We mitigated the incident by removing the affected server from service at 22:18 UTC, after which the queued merge commits were created within six minutes. <br /><br />We have capped the memory a single repository maintenance job may consume so that one repository cannot exhaust a server, and we have improved monitoring and alerting on storage server health to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of issues like this one in the future.
17 Sep 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 50 min
Elevated rate of errors for OpenAI models provided by Copilot
Between 20:26 and 21:17 UTC on September 17, 2026, GitHub Copilot experienced degradation affecting several GPT models, including GPT-5.6 Luna, GPT-5.6 Terra, GPT-5.6 Sol, GPT-5.3-Codex, and GPT-6 Astra. Users encountered elevated error rates when using these models.<br /><br />The degradation was caused by an issue with an upstream model provider. GitHub engineers detected the issue through automated monitoring and coordinated with the provider. Our automated model-warning system activated in-product warnings for affected models during the incident. Service returned to normal after the provider implemented a mitigation.
16 Sep 2026 · · GitHub
resolved in 10 h 28 min
Degradation with Gemini 3.8 Flash
On September 16, 2026, between 04:40 and 11:45 UTC, the Gemini 3.8 Flash model in GitHub Copilot experienced degraded availability. Requests to this model failed at an average rate of 6.4%, and the impact was highest during peak traffic hours. Other Copilot models were not affected. Users could continue to work with a different model or with 'Auto'.<br /><br />The degradation was caused due to a capacity issue with an upstream model provider. Failure rates returned to normal as the daily traffic peak passed. We monitored the model until it was healthy and resolved the incident at 17:48 UTC. We are working to make our systems resilient to cover peak demand for all the Copilot models.
